Mindset neutrality

Effective altruists have long argued for cause neutrality: that we shouldn’t prejudge what cause to focus on, but should choose causes based on impartial assessments of impact. Similarly, we should be open to changing causes as we receive new evidence of impact. But effective altruism should also be neutral in other regards. Recently, I argued that effective altruism should be resource neutral: that we shouldn’t prejudge whether to help others by spending money, time, or other resources, but should decide that question, too, based on impartial assessments of impact.

Yet another form of neutrality that hitherto hasn’t been much discussed within effective altruism is mindset neutrality: neutrality with respect to what mindset or virtues (e.g. truth-seeking, altruism, humility, etc) to cultivate. Cultivating a mindset or a set of virtues can be an effective way of increasing our impact, but it is obviously important that we choose the mindset and the virtues that actually are conducive to impact-maximisation. Thus, we shouldn’t prejudge what mindset and what virtues to cultivate, but should choose based on impartial assessments of impact. Similarly, we should be willing to change our views of what mindset and virtues to cultivate if we receive new relevant evidence, or if the circumstances change. For instance, if the amount of funding in effective altruism increases, it is natural to reduce the focus on material sacrifice. 

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Some forms of neutrality are no doubt easier to practice than others. For instance, it’s probably on average harder to be cause neutral than to be means neutral—neutral with respect to what means or interventions to use to address a given cause. People tend to feel more for causes than for interventions, as causes are more core to their identity.

My sense is that it’s still harder to practise mindset neutrality—and that effective altruists are, on average, worse at mindset neutrality than at cause neutrality. In my view, it seems that effective altruists have a bias in favour of virtues or mindsets that are popular (though not always practised) in the social circles that effective altruists are predominantly drawn from. One example is material sacrifice—the notion that we should spend little on ourselves. Another that effective altruists should listen more to outside experts—e.g. regarding cause prioritisation. A third that effective altruists should rather defer less to their effective altruist peers, and think more for themselves in relation to them. The two first express an ideal of humility, whereas the third celebrates independent thinking—all notions that are likely popular in liberal Western circles.

One may quibble over whether effective altruists are biased in favour of these particular virtues. But whether or not they are, it still seems to me that the way effective altruists argue for these and other virtues often falls short of ideal. In my experience, effective altruists often defend particular virtues using a moralised language that doesn’t refer to impact. If someone argued for a particular cause in that way, people would think that it clashes with cause neutrality and object to it. But the same thing doesn’t seem to happen in discussions about virtues and mindsets. My view is thus that effective altruists should try harder to cultivate mindset neutrality—and to discuss mindsets and virtues in the same detached way that we usually use to discuss causes and interventions.

Thanks to Ryan Carey for helpful comments.